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U.S. State Department released its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report
The TIP Report discusses how China’s One Child Policy, combined with son preference, has caused a gender imbalance that is driving human trafficking and sexual slavery, not only within China but from the surrounding countries as well. The Report lists the many nations from which women and girls are trafficked into China: “Women and children from neighboring Asian countries, including Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Mongolia, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as from Russia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas, are reportedly trafficked to China for commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor.”
COUNTRY REPORTS: CHINA
Our countries report section is comprised of reports, articles and other information related to gendercide and the targeted country.
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Sept. 1, 2005
The Chinese government is to make the selective abortion of female foetuses a criminal offence and will ban parents from obtaining ultrasound scans to discover their unborn baby's sex, in an attempt to tackle an unwanted side-effect of its "one-child" policy.
Sept. 15, 2005
China's one-child family policy has had a great effect on the lives of nearly a quarter of the world's population for a quarter of a century. When the policy was introduced in 1979, the Chinese government claimed that it was a short-term measure and that the goal was to move toward a voluntary small-family culture.1 In this article, we examine to what extent this goal has been achieved and the implications for the future of the policy. First we explain why the policy was introduced and how it is now implemented. We also examine the consequences of the policy in regard to population growth, the ratio between men and women, and the ratio between adult children and dependent elderly parents. Finally, we examine the relevance of the policy in contemporary China and whether the time has come for the policy to be relaxed.
August 23, 2013
AThe National Health and Family Planning Commission launched a campaign in Beijing on August 23, 2013, to help poverty-stricken rural girls.
According to Vice-minister of National Health and Family Planning Commission Wang Pei'an, the campaign is part of the 'Care for Girls' project launched in 2003 and is aimed at promoting social gender equality and correcting the sex ratio imbalance. Volunteer recruitment has started nationwide and an activity will be first held in Funan County in east China's Anhui Province.
March 2014
Abstract
Compared with that in other countries, the issue of fertility in China is more complicated because of its restriction policy or system. Several major hypotheses have been proposed to explain and predict the impact of migration on China’s fertility regardless of China’s real situation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the impact of migration on fertility considering China’s underlying restrictions using the data from the Chinese General Social Survey carried out in 2008. The social class in this study was divided into two, namely urban class and rural class. By building the 2 × 2 mobility tables and the diagonal mobility model, the study determined the impact of migration on fertility and analyzed the influence of some restrictions, such as family planning, traditional fertility concept, and household registration system. Results show that migration greatly affects fertility: upward migration (i.e., from rural to urban) may decrease the fertility, whereas downward migration (i.e., from urban to rural) may increase it. The degree of decline on fertility is greater than that of increase. Family planning still plays a role in fertility decline. Traditional concepts on fertility, for example, bringing up sons to take care of parents in their old age and preferring boys to girls, are anchored on the people’s mind, which is detrimental to the stability of the fertility rate. Moreover, the household registration system primarily influences the fertility behavior of temporary migration, with a negative relationship between them.
October 31, 2013
The fact that techniques of prenatal diagnosis are used in India and China to selectively eliminate females is widely known. It has been extensively reported in the international media and in scientific publications since the 1990s. The publication of the Census of India 2011 shows that the ratio of girls to boys below the age of 6 years continues to decline at an alarming rate. Following that publication, this topic has again received international attention. The aim of this article is to better inform the human genetics community of the magnitude of this practice and its consequences in India.In this overview, we examine the impact of prenatal technology on the sex ratio in India. We present facts and figures from the Census of India and other publications that show that the practice is wide spread throughout India, in urban and rural areas, among the rich and the poor, and among the educated and the illiterate. We also briefly discuss the possible causes, consequences, and solutions.
Oct. 08, 2013
China's one-child policy has been quite successful in bringing down the country's fertility level but has produced a large number of one-child families. The risk of one-child families losing their only child has not received enough attention. In this paper, using an extension of Goldman & Lord (1983)'s method to measure widowhood, period life-table data from China's 2000 population census are used to examine age-specific and cumulative probabilities of mothers losing their only child. It is found that a mother faces a 14.94% probability of losing a son, and 12.21% probability of losing a daughter. As the age of first-time mothers increases, the probability of losing a child declines. Urban and rural mothers have different indices regarding the loss of children. Based on these findings the prospects for China's one-child policy are discussed.
July 2013
Purpose: China has the highest excess of male births in the world at 118 to every 100 female, with a current excess of 20 million men of reproductive age. The impact on the psychological well-being of the large numbers of men who will never marry is unclear. This study was carried out to test the hypothesis that older never-married men are more predisposed to depression, low self-esteem and aggression.
Methods: The study was a cross-sectional survey using a self-completion questionnaire conducted in high sex ratio rural areas of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. The tools used were the Beck Depression Inventory, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale and the Bryant-Smith Aggression questionnaire.
Results: A total of 1,059 never-married men and 1,066 married men aged 30–40 completed questionnaires. Never-married men were financially poorer and had lower education levels than married ones. After adjusting for age, education and income, never-married men were significantly more likely to have lower self-esteem scores (P < 0.001), higher depression scores (P < 0.001), higher aggression scores (P < 0.001) and were more likely to have suicidal thoughts or wishes (P < 0.001) than married men.
Conclusion: The high prevalence of severe depression and suicide ideation in these men is of particular concern. In rural China mental health services are currently very sparse, but rural doctors could be trained to use a check score to identify severe depression, and refer as appropriate to specialist services.
December 9, 2013
Abstract:
Data on 2,355 married women from the 2006 China Health and Nutrition Survey are used to study how female employment affects fertility in China. China has deep concerns with both population size and female employment, so the relationship between the two should be better understood. Causality flows in both directions; hence, we use a plausible instrumental variable to isolate the effect of employment on fertility. Female employment reduces a married woman’s preferred number of children by 0.35 on average and her actual number by 0.50. Ramifications for China’s one-child policy are discussed.
2013
One of the main puzzles of modern population and social history is why, among all countries confronting rapid population growth in the second half of the twentieth century, China chose to adopt an extreme measure of birth control known as the one-child policy. A related question is why such a policy, acknowledged to have many undesirable consequences, has been retained for so long, even beyond the period of time anticipated by its creators.
With the world’s population growth rate now at half its historical peak level and with nearly half of the world’s population living in countries with fertility below replacement level, we can look back at the role politics played in formulating, implementing, and reformulating policies aimed at slowing population growth (Demeny and McNicoll 2006; Robinson and Ross 2007; Demeny 2011). In this context, an examination of China’s unprecedented government intervention in reproduction offers valuable lessons in appreciating the role of politics in the global effort of birth control in the twentieth century.
2013
Abstract
Because sex ratios at birth have risen sharply in China in recent decades, an increasing proportion of men will be unable to find a bride, and will face old age without the support of a wife and children. We project the proportions of never-married men and their geographical distribution in China in the coming decades. Our projections assume that two tendencies in current marriage patterns will persist: that women will continue to migrate to wealthier areas and to prefer men with better prospects. We find that, by 2030, more than 20 per cent of men in China aged 30–39 will never have married, and that the proportion will be especially high among poor men in low-income provinces that are least able to provide social protection programmes. The projected geographic concentration of bachelors could be socially disruptive, and the results suggest a need to expand the coverage and central financing of social protection programmes.
2005
Abstract:
Based on data from a snowball sampling survey conducted in rural Henan in 2001, we analyze the prevalence, patterns, and risk factors of prenatal sex selection and estimate its impact on sex ratio at birth. Our results indicate that prenatal sex selection is widely known and practiced in rural Henan; ex ante fetal sex and family sibset composition are the dominant predictors of abortion, regardless of maternal heterogeneity; and sex-selective abortion is the predominant, if not sole, cause of the sample's high sex ratio at birth.
June 2012
Abstract:
Objectives - There is growing evidence in China that son preference is on the decline, but the sex ratio at birth is still the highest in the world at around 120 male births to 100 females. The aim of the study was to explore attitudes towards gender preference among people of reproductive age, to determine the reasons why the sex ratio is persistently high, and to inform policy options.
Methods - We conducted in-depth interviews with 212 individuals who aged from 18 to 39 in rural and urban areas of three provinces: Yunnan, Guizhou and Zhejiang.
Results - We show that while son preference has weakened considerably, it has not disappeared. The sex ratio remains high, because of this small minority of individuals, who still choose sex-selective abortion to ensure male offsprings.
Conclusions - Intensive local policy interventions have been successful in reducing the sex ratio in some areas and these should be disseminated widely. In addition, the law forbidding sex selection should be actively enforced, and the One Child Policy should be relaxed in some areas, to reduce the disproportionately high sex ratio in the second order births.
May 15, 2012
Despite the grim outlook for the generation of males entering their reproductive years over the next two decades, the future is less bleak. The global SRB has probably already peaked. In South Korea, the sex ratio has already declined markedly and China and India are both reporting incipient declines: in China the SRB for 2010 was reported as 118 down from the peak of 121 in 2005, and, importantly,14 provinces with high sex ratios are beginning to show a downward trend [[19]]. India is now reported to have an SRB of around 109, down from a peak of around 111 in 2005 [[21]]. Whilst the combination of these incipient declines in SRB, and the changing attitudes towards the imperative to have sons, are encouraging, they will not start to filter through to the reproductive age group for another two decades. In China and India the highest sex ratio cohorts have yet to reach reproductive age, so the situation will get worse before it gets better. Normal sex ratios will not be seen for several decades.
Figure 1. Sex ratio at birth for China's provinces in 2005.
These overall figures conceal wide variations across the country (Fig 1): the SRB is higher than 130 in a strip of heavily populated provinces from Henan in the north to Hainan in the south, but close to normal in the large sparsely populated provinces of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Some are sceptical about these high SRB figures or have suggested that, under the constraints of the one‐child policy, parents might fail to register a newborn girl, so that they might go on to have a boy [[20]]. However, recent evidence shows that such under‐registration explains only a small proportion of missing females and that sex‐selective abortion undoubtedly accounts for the overwhelming majority [[18]].
June 2009
The apparently inexorable rise in the proportion of “missing girls” in much of East and South Asia has attracted much attention among researchers and policymakers. An encouraging trend was suggested by the case of South Korea, where child sex ratios (males to females under age 5) were the highest in Asia but peaked in the mid-1990s and normalized thereafter. Using census data, we examine whether similar trends have begun to manifest themselves in the two most populous countries of this region, China and India. The data indicate that child sex ratios are peaking in these countries, and in many subnational regions are beginning to trend toward lower, more normal values. This suggests that, with continuing economic and social development and vigorous public policy efforts to reduce son preference, the “missing girls” phenomenon could eventually disappear in Asia.
Sep 9, 2009
Retrospective period data (Figure 1), cohort trends by parity from these same data (Figures 2, ,3,3, ,4),4), previous analyses of trends using census data (Cai 2008; Retherford et al. 2005), China's current set of provincial-level fertility policies (Gu et al. 2007), and women's reports of ideal family size (in the 2001 survey used here; intentions that are undoubtedly strongly affected by the government's population policy mandates) all suggest that contemporary fertility rates in China are well below replacement level. The total fertility rate is in the range of 1.4 to 1.6, and our adjustments for fertility postponement suggest that completed fertility for cohorts now in their childbearing years will be roughly 10–15 percent higher than these estimates imply. Continued socioeconomic development is likely to play an increasingly important role both in reducing fertility intentions in China (because of the growing expense of raising children) and in reducing achieved fertility relative to intentions (because of increases in the mean age at childbearing and increased competition between raising children and other demands). A major unknown is possible changes in current government family planning policy. If policy does change, how will women's intentions change? The low-fertility proximate determinants model we have presented suggests that increases in fertility associated with increased intentions will likely be attenuated by increasing age at childbearing and associated consequences.
Apr 9, 2009
ABSTRACT:
Objectives - To elucidate current trends and geographical patterns in the sex ratio at birth and in the population aged under 20 in China and to determine the roles played by sex selective abortion and the one child policy.
Design - Analysis of household based cross sectional population survey done in November 2005.Setting All of China’s 2861 counties.Population 1% of the total population, selected to be broadly representative of the total.Main outcome measure Sex ratio defined as males per 100 females.
Results - 4764512 people under the age of 20 were included. Overall sex ratios were high across all age groups and residency types, but they were highest in the 1-4 years age group, peaking at 126 (95% confidence interval 125 to 126) in rural areas. Six provinces had sex ratios of over 130 in the 1-4 age group. The sex ratio at birth was close to normal for first order births but rose steeply for second order births, especially in rural areas, where it reached 146 (143 to 149). Nine provinces had ratios of over 160 for second order births. The highest sex ratios were seen in provinces that allow rural inhabitants a second child if the first is a girl. Sex selective abortion accounts for almost all the excess males. One particular variant of the one child policy, which allows a second child if the first is a girl, leads to the highest sex ratios.
Conclusions - In 2005 males under the age of 20 exceeded females by more than 32 million in China, and more than 1.1 million excess births of boys occurred. China will see very high and steadily worsening sex ratios in the reproductive age group over the next two decades. Enforcing the existing ban on sex selective abortion could lead to normalisation of the ratios.
ARTICLES 2009
2011
China has been an overachiever in the global process of demographic transition in the second half of the twentieth century. Its mortality decline was unparalleled in human history among populations of significant size, consequently setting the stage for rapid population growth. In turn, rapid population growth laid the foundation for an unprecedented state intervention in birth control. China’s fertility decline in the closing decades of the twentieth century was perhaps even more extraordinary for its speed and especially for the measures taken and the authorities involved. With China’s fertility now well below replacement level, what lies ahead for this demographic overachiever? In this chapter I examine three issues related to China’s demographic transition. First, I briefly review the demographic transition in China. Second, I discuss the role of the Chinese state, a particularly salient aspect of the demographic transition and one that has attracted much attention and caused a good deal of confusion. Third, using population projections, I highlight a few important features of China’s demographic future, deriving in large part from its status as a demographic overachiever.
Feb. 2011
ABSTRACT
Child underreporting is often neglected in studies of fertility and sex ratio imbalance in China. To improve estimates of these measures, I use intercensal comparisons to identify a rise in underreporting, which followed the increased enforcement and penalization under the birth planning system in 1991. A new triangulation of evidence indicates that about 19% of children at ages 0-4 were unreported in the 2000 census, more than double that of the 1990 census. This evidence contradicts assumptions underlying the fertility estimates of most recent studies. Yet, the analysis also suggests that China's fertility in the late 1990s (and perhaps beyond) was below officially adjusted levels. I then conduct a similar intercensal analysis of sex ratios of births and children, which are the world's highest primarily because of prenatal sex selection. However, given excess underreporting of young daughters, especially pronounced just after 1990, estimated ratios are lower than reported ratios. Sex ratios in areas with a "1.5-child" policy are especially distorted because of excess daughter underreporting, as well as sex-linked stopping rules and other factors, although it is unclear whether such policies increase use of prenatal sex selection. China's sex ratio at birth, once it is standardized by birth order, fell between 2000 and 2005 and showed a continuing excess in urban China, not rural China.